Volume 21 Number 53
Produced: Fri Sep 22 0:30:49 1995
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Is Israel considered Galut?
[Jan David Meisler]
Married women not covering hair and Dina deMalekhuta Dinah
[Moshe Sokolow]
Minimum Kashrus Standards
[Carl Sherer]
Sheva Mitzvot B'nei Noah
[Warren Burstein]
Shofar Orchestra
[Josh Wise]
Sources and Discussion
[Michael J Broyde]
Spark's Gourmet Coffee
[Francine S. Glazer]
Telephone Answering Machines
[Rafael Salasnik]
Teqi'at Shofar
[Joe Halberstadt]
This land is my land
[David Guberman]
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From: Jan David Meisler <jm8o+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 1995 13:14:30 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Is Israel considered Galut?
In one of the recent notes about American Jews stating their opinions
regarding Israel, one person indicated that a second seemed to state
that living in chu"l was a mitzva. The first person stated that he
thought living in Galut was a punishment.
My question does not have to do with the discussion about Jews outside
of Israel commenting on Israeli policy. But, I was wondering, is living
in Israel today considered living in Galut? True, various mitzvot can
be performed there and not in chu"l (such as shmittah, ma'aser, etc.)
since there is an intrinsic kedusha to the land. However, what is the
true meaning of galut?
One of the Rabbis of my shul was asked recently why G-d would have
created the concept of Tumat Hamet (impurity of a dead person), and the
mitzva of the parah adumah (red hefer) which would remove this tumah if
there would be a time (such as now) that we could never perform this
mitzvah, and therefore not perform other mitzvot properly. The answer
was that this is part of what it means to be in Galut. Not being able
to live in the most ideal manner serving G-d properly. Always concerned
about our neighbors (whether it is an Arab country or our non-Jewish
next door neighbor). Etc.
If this is the case, then living in Israel nowadays is still considered
to be living in Galut, is it not?
Yochanan
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From: <TorahDept@...> (Moshe Sokolow)
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 1995 09:03:55 -0400
Subject: Re: Married women not covering hair and Dina deMalekhuta Dinah
In re: "Married women not covering hair and Dina deMalekhuta Dinah"
(behe'eleim echad!), I am reminded of a visit to the New York State
Motor Vehicles Dept. to renew a driver's license, in the company of a
married neighbor. When she asked to be photographed with her hat on she
was told that it is against policy since the license is a form of ID.
She produced her US passport--in which she is photographed with a hat--
as evidence that it was acceptable and was told that NY State had higher
standards than the federal government.
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From: <adina@...> (Carl Sherer)
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 95 23:19:46 IDT
Subject: Minimum Kashrus Standards
The various local Rabbinates in Israel have a uniform set of
minimum Kashrus standards. Does anyone out there know what these
include?
-- Carl Sherer
Adina and Carl Sherer
You can reach us both at:
<adina@...>
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From: <warren@...> (Warren Burstein)
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 1995 08:04:04 GMT
Subject: Re: Sheva Mitzvot B'nei Noah
In digest <199509132143.RAA17182@...> feldblum@cnj.digex.net writes:
>Well, is that really true? My understanding is that the penalty to a
>ben-Noah (or bat-Noah) for violating any of the seven mitzvot is death.
>If you, as a juror, sentence someone who violates one of these mitzvot
>to something less than that, are you helping the ben-Noach government
>fulfill its obligations, or are you being a mikhshol lifnei iver
>(stumbling block before the blind)?
I don't have the book, but I once read a book by Rabbi Aharon
Lichtenstein on the subject of Bnei Noach which cited a source saying
that the court has the option to sentence a violator to death, but may
impose a lesser penalty if it sees fit.
|warren@ bein hashmashot, in which state are the survivors
/ nysernet.org buried?
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From: Josh Wise <jdwise@...>
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 1995 14:47:32 EDT
Subject: Shofar Orchestra
Edgar Braunschweig asks:
>Why can't you have a shofar quartet on rosh hashanah?
It would seem that the answer can be inferred from the prohibition of
blowing a shofar inside a pit (or a cave).
The reason behind this is that one is no longer hearing a true shofar
sound. It is now a complex sound of the shofar and its echo. Despite
the fact that it's still one shofar (and not a shofar and a tuba for
example) it is still prohibited.
All the more so, if there are many shofarim being sounded
simultaneously.
Josh Wise
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From: Michael J Broyde <relmb@...>
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 1995 19:47:11 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Sources and Discussion
A few weeks ago I wrote stating:
> > My examination of the teshuvot literature (incomplete that it
> >is) suggests to me that (and I say this somewhat tongue in check) that
> >there are more poskim who have published teshuvot asserting that halacha
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >does not require married women to cover their hair than there are
> >published teshuvot ruling that dina demalchuta does not apply in the
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >land of Israel.
A reader privately emailed me asking for sources permitting married wome
to uncover their hair, which -- with some hesitation -- I provided. That
reader recently posted the following:
> I did not check all these sources, but did discuss the issue with Rabbi
> Rubanowitz (Har Nof). He first said that none of these sources said
> what Rabbi Broyde claimed. He also said that to say such a thing would
> be contrary to the Shulhan `Arukh. We then proceeded to look it up in
> the Shulhan `Arukh (Even Ha`ezer 21), including a reference by the Be'er
> Hetev to the Shevut Yaakov that Rabbi Broyde quoted.
One of the things I have learned over time is when it is pointless to
respond. In response to a list of sources, the appropriate thing to do
is to look up the sources! I doubt that Rabbi Rubanowitz is familiar
with any of the sources I cited. Some of them are quite clear on this
topic. Whether they are normative or or not lehalacha is a different
topic. They certainly are quite clear. The Be'er Hatev, as is his
style, frequintly summarizes only part of a teshuva, and that is what
happened in this case with the Shevut Yakov. Readers who are interested
in this topic are encouraged to examine the sources themselves.
That reader goes on to state:
> As far as the issue of "dina demalkhuta dina" [applying the law of the
> land] not being applicable in Israel, Rabbi Broyde attempts to assert
> that very few posqim would say that it doesn't apply. However,
> according to Rabbi Rubanowitz, although there are those who agree with
> Rabbi Broyde, there are many more who disagree (and say that it does not
> apply in Israel).
I certianly do not know what many poskim think. I stated that there
were fewer published teshuvot ruling that way than there are teshuvot
permitting married wome to uncover their hair, and I have yet to see
someone post a citation to a published teshuva that rules that Dina
Demalchuta does not apply in the land of Israel.
With great interest I await a list of citations from Rabbi
Rubanowitz or Lon Eisenberg (who posted th quoted post). If no teshuvot
are forthcoming that support the assertion that dina demalchuta is
inaplicable in Israel, I suspect that it is because none could be
found.
Michael Broyde
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From: Francine S. Glazer <fglazer@...>
Date: Mon, 4 Sep 1995 12:24:51 -0400
Subject: Re: Spark's Gourmet Coffee
Rabbi Eidlitz has an email address on Prodigy:
<JFWS73A@...>
He also has a hotline phone #: (818) 762-3197
and a FAX #: (818) 980-6908
Fran Glazer
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From: Rafael Salasnik <Rafi@...>
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 1995 16:24:21 GMT
Subject: Telephone Answering Machines
My understanding regarding telephones on Shabbat/Chagim is that there is
a prohibition on both dialing and talking.
If that is so then by leaving an answering machine on one 'aids' a
non-orthodox person who phones you to commit the aveirah. If one
knows/expects such calls should one disconnect the ansaphone ? Does the
proportion of calls from Jews and non-Jews affect this ?
Also what about the issue of leaving the volume up, so one can hear the
call. I know that in many circumstances this is a benefit - for example
if one is concerned about someone, knowing that the call is not about
them, or a report that they are ok, or as was used in Desert Storm for
Israelis (after Shabbat) to let their frum family abroad know they were
ok.
Rafi
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From: Joe Halberstadt <fx_joe@...>
Date: Fri, 15 Sep 1995 09:15:52 GMT
Subject: Teqi'at Shofar
>From: Edgar Braunschweig <bradi@...>
>The following question came up in our elul-shiur:
>Why can't you have a shofar quartet on rosh hashanah?
>We all know it is not done, but why?
>Does anybody have an idea where to find an answer to this question or
>does anybody know of a synagogue where they have a shofar orchestra?
See Shulchan Aruch Siman 588 Seif 3 that one fulfills the Mitzvah if one
hears two shofaros simultaneously.
There is actually an opinion there that if one hears two at one time,
one can count them as having heard two separate series of notes.
Yossi
Joe Halberstadt <HALBERSTADTJ@...>
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From: <dguberman@...> (David Guberman)
Date: Thu, 14 Sep 1995 16:52:21 GMT
Subject: Re: This land is my land
Reading Rav Soloveitchik's "The Individual and the Community" (in
_On Repentance_) called to mind Rabbi Teitz's statement that, "[s]ince
the land is mine, I should have a right to comment on matters that
affect that land."
Discussing Maimonides' discussion of the scapegoat as a communal
sacrifice, Rav Soloveitchik says:
[A] `communal sacrifice` has one sole owner, exactly as does an
individual offering. Who is its owner? It is the entire community
of Israel, which according to the law is not the sum total or
arithmetic aggregate of such and so many individuals but a single
composite personality in its own right. _Knesset Israel_ (the
community of Israel) . . . constitutes an indivisible and separate
legal body in the same way as any individual is a single legal
personality. . . .
* * *
The same line of thought applies regarding . . . "the Land of
Israel which we possess by virtue of our forefathers" (Babylonian
Talmud, Baba Batra 119a). Does this mean that every Jew shares
individually in the ownership of the Land of Israel? It does not.
The Land of Israel is not the individual property of any Jew by
himself; rather, it belongs to the whole of Israel as an
independent entity. . . . [N]owadays again when the tribal
divisions no longer hold, the right of the Jewish People to the
Land of Israel is not of an individual nature; it is a right
accruing to the Jewish people as a whole. I, as an individual[,]
can make no claims to the land. My personal share derives from my
membership in _Knesset Israel_. Since the land belongs to _Knesset
Israel_, I have a share in it as well. The individual Jew's right
to the Land of Israel is derived from the communal prerogative of
_Knesset Israel_ as a metaphysical entity. . . . The individual Jew
who is detached from the main body of Israel can make no claims to
rights in the Land of Israel. [pp. 115-16]
Naturally the question arise, who belongs to _Knesset
Israel_? Rav Soloveitchik answers:
A Jew who has lost his faith in Knesset Israel, even though he
may personally sanctify and purify himself by being strict in his
observance of the precepts and by assuming prohibitions upon
himself-- such a Jew is incorrigible and is totally unfit to join
in the day of Atonement which encompasses the whole of _Knesset
Israel_, in all its components and all its generations. . . . The
Jew who believes in _Knesset Israel_ is the Jew who lives as part
of it where it is and is willing to give his life for it, feels its
pain, rejoices with it, fights in its wars, groans at its defeats
and celebrates its victories. . . . [p. 137]
I infer, perhaps incorrectly, that ownership of the Land is as
metaphysical as the entity owning it. That is, _Knesset Israel_
continued to "own" the Land during all the centuries of exile and
non-Jewish sovereignty. Similarly, _Knesset Israel_ will continue to
"own" the Land even after the State of Israel withdraws from actual
(i.e., non-metaphysical) hectares of land as part of the peace process
with the Palestinians. Simply put, the metaphysical ownership of the
Land by _Knesset Israel_ is indestructible. However, this imposes no
constraint on decisions by the State of Israel to enter, or not to
enter, into agreements involving physical withdrawal from parts of the
physical land.
Another point. It seems that Rav Soloveitchik holds that fighting
in the wars of _Knesset Israel_, or at least the wars of the part of
_Knesset Israel_ where one lives, is a requirement of membership,
notwithstanding one's otherwise observant behavior. If so, then it also
seems that those Jews residing in Israel who do not "fight[] in its
wars" have no share in _Knesset Israel_ (and they, and their
representatives in the Israeli parliament, should not be considered in
calculations of "Jewish majorities," assuming such calculations have any
legitimacy), _unless_ the State of Israel itself is not an expression of
_Knesset Israel_ (so that the wars of the State of Israel would not be
considered wars of _Knesset Israel_). Whatever else one might say on
this score, it would seem that anyone outside Israel who claims that the
"unless" clause applies could not also claim a right to be involved in
the Israeli decision-making process (not even the limited speech right
that I have affirmed previously) based upon linkage to the Land through
membership in _Knesset Israel_. Alternatively, if the State of Israel
is an expression of _Knesset Israel_, then it may be that decisions by
the government of the State of Israel have validity as communal
decisions that must be respected, _unless_, for example, one holds
against Maimonides (and, according, R. Rackmann, also Rav Soloveitchik)
that the mandate for war for Eretz Israel is effective even in the
absence of king, consent of the Sanhedrin, and the high-priest.
I would be grateful if those with more knowledge than I would
consider these issues and share their learning with us.
Shanah Tovah,
David A. Guberman <dguberman@...>
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End of Volume 21 Issue 53