Volume 29 Number 63
Produced: Wed Aug 25 16:50:25 US/Eastern 1999
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Kinyan = ownership?
[Perry Zamek]
Manumission
[Shalom Carmy]
Morality of Slavery
[Warren Burstein]
Polygamy vs Slavery--A difference for supporting one vs the other
[David Zilberberg]
Slavery and a Higher Moral Authority
[Zvi Weiss]
Slavery and a higher morality
[Moshe Feldman]
Slavery and higher morality
[David Glasner]
Slavery in the Messianic Era
[Warren Burstein]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Perry Zamek <jerusalem@...>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1999 14:29:58 +0300
Subject: Kinyan = ownership?
Zvi Weiss, in MJv29n57, writes:
>Perhaps, I
>can INCREASE his discomfort by pointing out that the Gemara states that
>the WIFE of a Kohen (who is not a Bas Kohen) may eat Teruma (which is
>normally prohibited to non-Kohanim on pain of death!) because she is the
>PROPERTY of the Kohen ("Kinyan Kaspo", I believe is the term used..).
One of the key issues that Zvi, and many others in the "Slavery" thread,
are trying to grapple with, is the way in which certain concepts are
interpreted in different cultural contexts. For example, some people
hear the word "slavery", and immediately "see" scenes from Roots, which
reflect the negative side of American slavery. Others see something
entirely different, looking at the concept "through the Gemara's eyes"
(so to speak).
The same applies to the concept of "Kinyan". In its literal sense, it
does seem to imply acquisition, and on that basis the wife of the Kohen
is his "property".
I would like to suggest an alternative interpretation -- "Kinyan" in the
sense of undertaking, or obligation. (as in, he "made a kinyan to carry
out a certain act") In that sense, the Kohen's wife (the daughter of a
non-Kohen) may eat Terumah because he (the Kohen) has made an
undertaking or commitment to her, by virtue of the Kiddushin act -- to
relate to her with a sense of Holiness (Kiddushin from Kadosh?) within
the marriage framework. Thus, she is not his property, but the
beneficiary of his commitment. (And her acceptance of Kiddushin is not
in the sense of "selling herself", but in the sense of accepting, or
even reciprocating, his commitment.)
If I recall correctly, a man who has determined to divorce his wife
(i.e. in his own mind) is no longer permitted to have sexual relations
with her -- this would be since his decision has undermined the
relationship that began with Kiddushin. Might one not argue, similarly
(although I have never seen this written), that if a Kohen has
determined to divorce his wife, then she might not be allowed to eat
Terumah, since *he* has "backed out" of his original commitment? (On the
other hand, maybe the comparison doesn't work, since eating Terumah is
different from sexual relations, in that the latter goes to the
fundamental basis of marriage.)
For us to think about...
Perry Zamek | A Jew should live his life in such a way
Peretz ben | that people can say of him: "There goes
Avraham | a living Kiddush Hashem".
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Shalom Carmy <carmy@...>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 1999 13:14:13 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Manumission
1. There is no mitzva to own slaves. The question of l'olam bahem
taavodu refers to freeing the slaves you already have.
2. How far this prohibition extends is itself a subject of dispute.
Being precise about these halakhot may not resolve every aspect of our
discomfort about the discrepancy between the institution of avdut and
the negative nature of slavery. But I believe that it does contribute to
seeing the problems in a correct perspective.
Pardon my brevity.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Warren Burstein <warren@...>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 1999 13:50:55
Subject: Morality of Slavery
>From: Joseph Geretz <jgeretz@...>
>I once heard the institution of Halachic slavery explained in the
>following manner. Many years ago, before Niskatnu HaDoros (generational
>diminishment) when people were able to ascend to high spiritual levels,
>it would be perfectly appropriate for a person on a high spiritual level
>to 'own' a person on a lower spiritual level. This would be a benevolent
>arrangement which would benefit the slave as well as the master, much in
>the way that a child benefits from the dominant role which his parents
>have over him.
I politely but insistently ask that people do not write 'slavery'
without making it clear whether they refer to Eved Ivri or to Eved
Cnaani.
If the above explanation deals with Eved Ivri, how is Eved Cnaani to be
understood?
If it also deals with Eved Cnaani, how does it deal with the prohibition
of freeing a slave (of the eved cnaani sort), even if the slave (or the
slave's descendent) advances spiritually?
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: David Zilberberg <ZilbeDa@...>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1999 09:24:26 -0400
Subject: Polygamy vs Slavery--A difference for supporting one vs the other
Russell Hendel <rhendel@...> wrote:
<<<A person who is so poor that he cannot afford clothing is allowed to
sell his daughter to be brought up with another family (and possibly
marry the person's son). Do we really have an alternative solution to
poverty? >>>
YES!! We do have an alternative. All modern societies tax its citizens
so that the poor will have what to eat and pay the rent and go to
school. In this way the entire society, and in the case of the jewish
nation, appropriately the jewish people, bear the burden of their fellow
countryman's poverty. This idea is not "pop cuture morality" but is
present in jewish law, which provides for maaser ani, leket shikcha and
peah, etc... Society should not present its citizens with the
alternative of let their daughters starve or else sell them to the
highest bidder.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Zvi Weiss <weissz@...>
Date: Sat, 21 Aug 1999 23:08:01 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Re: Slavery and a Higher Moral Authority
> From: David Zilberberg <ZilbeDa@...>
> I agree with the posters who point to other non-halakhic sources such as
> kiddush hashem (sanctifying God's name) and "you shall do what is good
> and righteous" as sources for morality above halakha, and would add that
> perhaps the most compelling argument against slavery is contained in
> bereishis when God creates man "in His image." Whats troubling about
> these arguments is that they run counter to the blackletter halakha-
> slavery is not just permitted, but halkha seems designed to perpetuate
> it- one who frees his non-jewish slave transgresses a positive
> commendment. There is no equivilent duty, for example, not to divorce a
> second wife.
Please give an isntacne where "Kiddush HAshem" is the basis for
NULLIFYING a mitzvah in the Torah. It appears to me that the
"invocation" of Kiddush Hashem here is an act of desperation. People --
conditioned by "American Society" are uncomfortable that the Torah does
not appear to share those lofty sentiments and so a way is sought to
hamronize Torah with America (as opposed to the other way around)...
I would suggest that Kiddush Hashem does NOT refer to the abolition of
slavery -- but to its reinstatement! When People see the sensitivity
with which Jews treat their slaves -- treatment that is "Lifnim Mishurat
Hadin" going far beyond what the "base halakha" mandates -- they will be
truly amazed at the sensitivity of Torah -- especially when contrasted
with the behaviour of MODERN societies where (it is alleged) slavery
still exists! For a fuller discussion, I would also suggest the NEtziv
in Parshat NOach (by the incident were Noach curses one of his
children)... who provides a very interesting esposition of "slavery"....
--Zvi
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Moshe Feldman <MFeldman@...>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1999 10:57:56 -0400
Subject: Re: Slavery and a higher morality
Yitzchok Zlochower wrote:
<<The topic of the morality of slavery is basically a subtopic on the
existence of a morality outside of halacha. Is there a requirement to go
outside the limits of halacha in accordance with our own sense of right and
wrong? Are we intitled to our own subjective moral judgements? Is slavery in
an halachic framework morally wrong today or in some ideal future? There are
those who appear to believe that things permitted by the Torah and the
talmudic sages are morally correct, by definition.>>
How about an intermediate position--that our notions of morality can
improve/ be refined over time. Though I am not well-read in R. Kook, I
understand that R. Kook writes that while we may not be personally as
great as our ancestors, we may be dwarves standing on the shoulders of
giants (who therefore see further). (I would appreciate if someone
could point me to this discussion in Rav Kook's works, or to a
discussion in a book about Rav Kook.) As a result, over the generations
the Jewish people becomes more and more refined until it merits the
Messiah (kabbalistically--doing tikun to the sh'virat haKelim). Thus in
the case of polygamy vs. monogamy, it is more moral to be monogamous,
and that is why R. Gershom enacted that requirement.
People seem bothered by the notion that our great ancestors, such as
Abraham and Jacob, who were polygamous, could have done something that
is on a lower moral level. However, it is possible to argue that vis a
vis the mores of their time, they were moral. [I seem to recall
Dr.Chaim Soloveitchik making a similar comment during a digression from
his lecture.] Compare with Rav Dessler (in Michtav Me'eliyahu, kuntrus
habechirah) who argues that Hashem judges people relative to their own
level (their "nikudat habechirah"--their point of choice)--a person who
is shomer Shabbat his entire life does not receive much credit for
desisting from turning on the light on Shabbat, while a newly-minted
ba'al tshuvah receives much credit for that.
Kol tuv,
Moshe
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: David Glasner <DGLASNER@...>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 1999 12:02:32 -0400
Subject: Re: Slavery and higher morality
David Silverberg wrote:
<<< I agree with the posters who point to other non-halakhic sources such as
kiddush hashem (sanctifying God's name) and "you shall do what is good
and righteous" as sources for morality above halakha, and would add that
perhaps the most compelling argument against slavery is contained in
bereishis when God creates man "in His image." Whats troubling about
these arguments is that they run counter to the blackletter halakha-
slavery is not just permitted, but halkha seems designed to perpetuate
it- one who frees his non-jewish slave transgresses a positive
commendment. There is no equivilent duty, for example, not to divorce a
second wife. >>>
You take for granted that halakha cannot change, but we know that it
can. Moabite women were not permitted to mary Jewish men, based on an
explicit Biblical verse. In the time of Ruth and Boaz, the halakha was
apparently changed by introducing a new reading of the Biblical text
that excluded all Moabites from assimilation into the Jewish people.
Now some may say that the new textual interpretation introduced at that
time was really the old true reading which either had been forgotten or
had never been tested, so that a dispute arose when an actual case came
before the court about how to read the relevant Biblical passage. Even
if one grants that possibility, for argument's sake, the Rambam in
Mamrim 2:1 clearly gives a Sanhedrin the authority to change the halakha
established by a predecessor based on an alternative reading of the
relevant Biblical text. So just because we have a drasha on the verse
"l'olam bahem ta'avodu" which has been accepted l'halakha to mean that
the owner of a non-Jewish slave should not free the slave without good
cause (such as enabling nine Jews who wish to pray with a minyan to do
so), that does not mean that a reestablished Sanhedrin would necessarily
continue to interpret the verse in the same way.
Consider, moreover, that R. Akiva and R. Tarfon were quite willing to
abrogate the positive Biblical commandment "u'viarta ha-ra mi-kirbekha"
when they stated that had they been judges capital punishment would
never have carried out in their courts.
Besides, since to my knowledge (and hope), no Jews any longer own
slaves, the halakha is effectively extinct. There is certainly no
reading of the verse that suggests a positive commandment to acquire new
slaves. And finally, the principle of darkei shalom (a derivative of
"v'asita ha-tov v'ha-yashar b'einei hashem") can, when necessary, be
invoked to override a halakha that invidiously discriminates against
gentiles.
David Glasner
<dglasner@...>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Warren Burstein <warren@...>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1999 09:29:12
Subject: Re: Slavery in the Messianic Era
With regard to the suggestion that slavery would be a "back door" into
Judaism in the Messianic Era, I would suggest that anyone so determined
to become Jewish that he's willing to enslave himself should be an
exception from the rule against conversion in this era.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
End of Volume 29 Issue 63
