Volume 44 Number 32
Produced: Fri Aug 20 5:59:19 EDT 2004
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Halachic parasitism (3)
[Chana Luntz, Shinnar, Meir, Binyomin Segal]
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From: Chana Luntz <Chana@...>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 18:37:03 +0100
Subject: Halachic parasitism
Meir Shinnar writes:
>This is a classical case of being machmir at someone else's
>expense - if pushing the child in a stroller is enough of a
>justification to rely on the eruv, why should only the wife
>push the eruv ? Hilchot shabat are equally obligatory on
>the wife(the issue of children is different, becuase the
>level of obligation is different). Either you believe the
>eruv shouldn't be relied on, in which case you stay home to
>take care of the baby while the wife walks, or you believe
>it can be relied enough for this case - in which case help
>the wife push the stroller (even if you want to wear a
>shabbos belt). This is halachic parasitism - living
>a life that's dependent on someone else violating your idea
>of what the halacha is.
It is only halachic parasitism if you do not treat your the wife as
separate entity with separate halachic integrity and/or you do not
believe that while you can hold the halacha is one way, so long as there
is what on which to rely, others are entitled to do differently.
To take this out of the theoretical, and make the case clearer, let me
use the example of the North West London Eruv, with which I am familiar.
There are a number of issues with the North West London Eruv, as there
are with any eruv, but perhaps the most clear cut one is this. There is
a building in North West London called Spaniards Inn. And for a whole
range of complicated reasons, including the location of the Hampstead
Heath and the various railway lines, the boundary of the eruv basically
had to run alongside Spaniards Inn. Now Spaniards Inn is a listed
building, which in England makes it very difficult to make any building
modifications whatsoever, which would include putting up poles and
wires. And so while the Local Authority has been reasonably sympathetic
to the need to put up poles and wires where needed (which is only a few
places, because most of the eruv uses the fences running along the
railway lines), it would have a great deal of difficulty at Spaniards
Inn.
Now in general this is not a problem, because the Inn itself has walls
which can serve as part of the boundary of the eruv. But, there is one
gap. And that gap is a certain distance apart. And, as it happens that
gap is sufficiently small that it is a kosher gap for an eruv IF you
measure tefachim in accordance with the Chazon Ish, and even in
accordance with the measurements for tefachim of Rav Moshe Feinstein.
BUT the gap is too large if you measure tefachim in accordance with the
measurement of Rav Chaim Na'eh.
So, whose calculations do you rely on for the measurement of a tefach?
The Chazon Ish, Rav Moshe Feinstein or Rav Chaim Na'eh? Which you
select will depend on whether or not you can carry within this eruv (I
am slightly simplifying here, because which you select might depend on
whether you think North West London is a reshus harabbim d'orisa or
d'rabbanan).
Now your post is based on an assumption that the husband and wife must
hold similiarly on this point. But this is not necessarily the case.
To again take an extreme example, the Sephardim have no real source for
holding anything other than R' Chaim Na'eh (the larger shiurim tend to
be an Ashkenazi thing). If a Sephardi man marries an Ashkenazi woman
who holds by the eruv, you appear to be holding, point blank, that she
must convert over to his position and stop carrying. Now there are some
who hold this, but that is by no means a universal position and it does
not seem to me to be halachic parasitism (if anything the reverse) if
the husband says, I hold by the shiurim of Rav Chaim Na'eh, and can find
no sources in my tradition that allows me to hold otherwise, but I
recognise that within your tradition there are indeed sources which
allow for a bigger tefach than in my tradition, and based on that
tradition I respect your right to carry in the eruv.
And even if you are talking about two Ashkenazim. A husband may well
say that, based on his learning he feels integrity bound to hold by the
shiurim of Rav Chaim Na'eh, despite the inconvenience, but he does not
feel that he has the right to impose the conclusions of that learning on
his wife, where it will cause her significant hardship, given that she
has eminent scholars within the London Community and elsewhere on whom
to rely. Again, this does not seem to me to be halachic parasitism,
rather the reverse. If they were to follow the position which the
husband believes is correct, nobody would carry, but he does not feel it
is right for him to impose that view on her.
And then there is a third aspect - that of kavod habriyus [perhaps best,
although not literally, translated as respect for human dignity]. In
cases of hardship, the halacha has a certain (albeit limited) inbuilt
flexibility which allows for reliance on what may be minority opinions
especially where human dignity may be enhanced. One has to be careful
with this, because it is not a carte blanche. But certainly in
circumstances where many people may be relying on an eruv, or certain
shiurim l'chatchila, even if the husband does not agree with this as a
l'chatchila position, he may well legitimately hold that in a case of
hardship there is on who to rely. And he may well feel that while he,
the husband, would if faced with the choice independently choose to
always stay at home (ie never eat out, never go out when the other
spouse is not in etc), he does not have the right to impose that
hardship on his wife.
And the fact that he is out walking with his wife who is doing the
pushing - are you so sure that in fact he is the one who wants to be out
there walking, while the wife is doing the enabling? Maybe in fact he
would be more than happy to be at home, but his wife wants him there,
and at lleast he can give his company, even if integrity will not let
him actually push.
Regards
Chana
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From: Shinnar, Meir <Meir.Shinnar@...>
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 14:32:50 -0400
Subject: RE: Halachic parasitism
WRT to Chana Luntz's erudite as usual post. I agree that there may be
cases where this is not halachic parasitism, but this does not apply to
my post.
The case initially posted was
>It is not unusual to see couples in Yerushalayim where the husband
>wears a shabbos belt to avoid carrying a key and the wife pushes their
>infant in a stroller.
RCL suggested three possible legitimate reasons for the wife pushing the
stroller, while the husband walks along and is machmir.
1) The wife has her own halachic shitta. That is a legitimate reason -
and the issue of how far the wife has to take her husband's shittot is a
matter of some dispute - but does this really apply to the case and the
community being described above??
2)The husband is machmir, but does not wish to impose his humra on the
wife. Here, WADR to RCL, I am in disagreement. The issue in my mind is
different. The fact that he allows his wife to carry is proof that he
views the other position is legitimate, even if not his prefered
position. Therefore, his own position is a humra - and his "integrity"
leads him to violate the kavod habriyot of his wife. Integrity can't be
bought by somebody else doing the work.
3) The issue of kavod habriyot - the suggestion is that the reliance on
the eruv is only for the sake of hardship, and it is the wife's hardship
- and therefore the heter is for her. This was essentially the original
poster's position - that reliance on the eruv is only for hardship such
assmall children, and therefore that is why women push the stroller.
WADR, I would suggest that the fact that it is the wife's hardship
means, or should mean, that it is his hardship as well - even if for him
it is a different type of hardship - and he therefore can also push the
stroller - and his viewing it as only the wife's hardship is a
fundamental failing in kavod habriyot.
Meir Shinnar
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From: Binyomin Segal <bsegal@...>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2004 01:50:51 -0500
Subject: Re: Halachic parasitism
>> It is not unusual to see couples in Yerushalayim where the husband
>> wears a shabbos belt to avoid carrying a key and the wife pushes
>> their infant in a stroller.
Meir Shinnar:
> This is a classical case of being machmir at someone else's expense -
> if pushing the child in a stroller is enough of a justification to rely
> on the eruv, why should only the wife push the eruv ? Hilchot shabat
> are equally obligatory on the wife(the issue of children is different,
> becuase the level of obligation is different). Either you believe the
> eruv shouldn't be relied on, in which case you stay home to take care of
> the baby while the wife walks, or you believe it can be relied enough
> for this case - in which case help the wife push the stroller (even if
> you want to wear a shabbos belt). This is halachic parasitism - living
> a life that's dependent on someone else violating your idea of what the
> halacha is.
With all due respect, I believe Meir is making a vital error. Halacha
and halachik decision making allow for subtle distinction which Meir's
black and white either-or judgement misses.
The least important point is one regarding "amira l'yehudi" (telling a
Jew [to do something for you on Shabbos]). From Torah law, having
someone else (generally a non-jew) do melacha for you on shabbos is
permitted. The rabbis legislated to forbid it. But it is a matter of
some dispute whether that prohibition extends to a jew. That is,
although there is a prohibition against telling a non-jew to do melacha
for you, or benefitting from melacha that a non-jew does, there is
significant evidence that there is NO SUCH prohibition in regard to
telling a jew to do melacha for you or benefitting from melacha they
do. Certainly it is prohibited to tell a jew to do melacha on shabbos if
it is forbidden for them to do it - but not because of hilchos
shabbos. The classic situation in which this applies is when one person
accepts shabbos early. Although it is forbidden for the person to tell a
non-jew to do melacha at that point, it is PERMITTED for someone to have
a jew who has not yet accepted shabbos do melacha for them. The more
modern situation, about which the modern poskim seem to disagree, is
when a diaspora jew is in Israel for yom tov. Many poskim feel that a
diaspora jew may have an israeli jew do melacha for them on the second
day of yom tov. All this is just by way of suggesting that having
another jew do melacha for you, when it is permitted for them is not as
obviously problematic as might be imagined.
More importantly though, much of this discussion ignores the fact that
halacha and chumra operate under different rules. In fact, carrying in
an eruv is a very good example of the difference. There is little room
for doubt that allowing an eruv around a community is normative. There
is a long tradition to accept them. But accepting that the psak allows
carrying does NOT close the door on the discussion for what an
individual should do. A careful study of the source material surrounding
eruv makes it hard to intellectually accept community eruvim. And a
person has the right, perhaps even an obligaton, to be true to his sense
of the sources. Certainly this must be balanced with other obligations -
including helping a spouse with children. But certainly an acceptable
alternative is to accept a strict interpretation for oneself - to be
true with ones own learning - while not imposing that chumra on the rest
of the family.
Much of the criticism of this distinction assumes, I think, that the
disparity was imposed by the man. Hence the man is imposing his chumra
on the woman by not carrying and not helping with the kids. My
experience though suggests something else. The man discusses the issue
with his wife who encourages him to take on the chumra that allows him
to stay true to his understanding. The man acquiesces but refuses to
impose his chumra on the rest of the family. It seems to me that
assuming the woman played a passive role in the decision making for the
family imposes a judgment for which there is no evidence. And if the
woman agreed to the distinction it is no longer imposing chumra. Rather
it is choosing the tools most appropriate for each family member to
grow.
I know my rebbe (Rav Yerachmiel Chassid) refused to allow his children
to take on any chumras of this sort so that they would not judge the
others around them. He felt that while an adult could master the subtle
distinction of "this is right for me, but not for everyone" that is
required of chumra, children were more apt to be black and white, "if I
have to do this, then anyone who doesn't do this is doing something
wrong." To prevent his children from making those judgements he insisted
that they e.g. carry in the eruv and end shabbos after 30 minutes.
I know this opens up the whole "chumra" discussion, which we have had
here many times. It is an important one, but I'm not sure I want to
rewrite or repost much that has been said before. Suffice it to say that
while there are certainly limitations - using the chumra to seem
"frummer" and imposing the chumra on others are two crucial examples -
part of personal growth is to choose chumras that help oneself express
his/her personal commitment to do what G-d wants. (for source material
see earlier posts, or the mesilas yesharim)
b'ahava
binyomin
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End of Volume 44 Issue 32
