Volume 60 Number 09
Produced: Wed, 18 May 2011 17:17:19 EDT
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
A question on Talmudic theodicy (2)
[Akiva Miller Shalom Carmy]
Being driven to shul on Shabbat (2)
[Ed Greenberg Batya Medad]
Bris on Shabbos - Carrying Knife
[Gershon Dubin]
Creative Explanations
[Frank Silbermann]
Halacha when threatened with rape (4)
[Martin Stern Frank Silbermann Michael Rogovin Daniel Cohn]
Megilat Sefer
[Rabbi Meir Wise]
Pictures of women
[Akiva Miller]
Selective justice?
[Martin Stern]
Sins and non-sins (2)
[Josh Backon Frank Silbermann]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Akiva Miller <kennethgmiller@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 09:01 AM
Subject: A question on Talmudic theodicy
Martin Stern (MJ 60#08) asked:
> I still have a problem with this passage. Iyov would appear to
> have been struck down fairly soon after the event but Bil'am was
> only killed some 40 years later even though he was clearly much
> more deserving of punishment. Surely he should have been killed
> sooner.
> Can anyone suggest an explanation for what appears at first sight
> to be an unfair situation?
Yes, at first sight it seems unfair. But at second sight, please look at the
larger picture -- in other words, include their afterlives as well.
Bil'am's 40 years appear to have been a reward, and that seems unfair. I would
suggest that it was indeed a reward, for whatever good things he did do in his
life, and that his afterlife was that much worse because of it.
And similarly, Iyov seems to have been punished, and perhaps indeed he was. But
because he got his punishment in this world, his next world was that much better.
Akiva Miller
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Shalom Carmy <carmy@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 11:01 AM
Subject: A question on Talmudic theodicy
Martin Stern <md.stern@...> (MJ 60#08) asked:
> The Gemara (Sotah 11a) tells us that Paro had three advisors,
> Bil'am, Iyov and Yitro. When he consulted them about how to solve the Jewish
> problem, Bil'am advised him to kill the boys, Yitro sensed that this was what
> Paro wanted to do so he fled but Iyov simply stayed and kept quiet.
>
> Bil'am was punished by being killed, Iyov was punished by having
> great sufferings and Yitro was rewarded in that his descendants sat on the
> Great Sanhedrin.
>
> We are presumably meant to learn from this aggadata that when some
> injustice is planned we are not allowed to keep quiet and if we do we are to
> some extent also culpable - we must dissociate ourselves from it even if,
> because we will be unable to prevent it, the only way is to run away before
> it is carried out.
>
> Perhaps Yitro's reward was postponed to later generations because he
> did not himself protest actively and try to have the plan reversed, but he
> was eventually rewarded nonetheless.
>
> I still have a problem with this passage. Iyov would appear to have
> been struck down fairly soon after the event but Bil'am was only killed
> some 40 years later even though he was clearly much more deserving of
> punishment. Surely he should have been killed sooner.
>
>
> Can anyone suggest an explanation for what appears at first sight to
> be an unfair situation?
1. To begin with, at a peshat level, I don't know that we should
insist on micro-calculations of justice. We are not G-d's
accountants and I don't know if it is best to look at the Ribbono
shel Olam as calculating in this way either. This is a long sugya,
not for now.
Nor will I address other considerations -- namely that Bilaam serves a
specific function as a prophet, he is assigned a task in Biblical
history, that his immediate demise would have prevented him from
fulfilling. If I were G-d's chief of staff (which I am not!) I would
surely take this into account.
2. One reason for my last comment is that we do not assess the
quality of a person's experience or life by adding up goods and
evils as one would calculate a bank account. Think of the following: one
life, in which there is a lot of suffering early and vindication
late; another where a successful life ends in disgrace and
loneliness. Assuming the "quantity" of good and bad is the same in
both, we would not consider both lives equivalent.
3. Which leads me back to the particular case: Job is vindicated
after his suffering; Bilaam ends up disgraced and repudiated.
According to Hazal his life is a short one (see Sanhedrin Perek
Helek); Job's is explicitly described as a long one.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Ed Greenberg <edg@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 08:01 AM
Subject: Being driven to shul on Shabbat
While on vacation in FL this winter, I spied a Pedicab device,
a tricycle with a driver's saddle and a bench seat, covered with an awning.
The device was labeled with the name and telephone number of the local
orthodox shul, and it offered rides on Shabbos and Yom Tov.
Ed
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Batya Medad <ybmedad@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 11:01 AM
Subject: Being driven to shul on Shabbat
In Israel it's common and halachikly accepted for the handicapped to have
special Shabbat vehicles. They aren't regular vehicles driven by
goyim. There is something "delayed" in the way it works, like the
telephones for doctors. Those who have the heter to use them also use
them during the week.
Batya
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Gershon Dubin <gershon.dubin@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 04:01 AM
Subject: Bris on Shabbos - Carrying Knife
Carl Singer <carl.singer@...> wrote (MJ 60#08):
> Gershon Dubin's comment is somewhat less than generous in characterizing my
> words as speculation or opinion!
> The gemorah specifically states what I said above. The logic being that
> Bris occurs before Shabbos in the Torah. The Shulchan Orach obviously disagrees.
Please provide the citation that the Gemara gives this logic in permitting
carrying the knife on Shabbos.
Gershon
<gershon.dubin@...>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Frank Silbermann <frank_silbermann@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 08:01 AM
Subject: Creative Explanations
Russell J Hendel wrote (MJ60#08):
> c) Why does a religion which has two strands of learning - citation
> and creativity - now emphasize only the citation strand?
>
> d) Why are only Gedolim allowed (and then infrequently) to come up
> with creative explanations?
My guess is it's the danger that one's creative explanation may conflict
with something else in the Torah, thus causing confusion and work
for later generations to come up with tortured interpretations to make
them consistent with one another. (Yes, I know this already happens,
but why add to the problem?)
This is less likely to happen if the person coming up with the creative
explanation has encyclopedic knowledge of the sources.
Frank Silbermann Memphis, Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Martin Stern <md.stern@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 08:01 AM
Subject: Halacha when threatened with rape
Sammy Finkelman <sammy.finkelman@...> (MJ 60#08) wrote:
> I think that according to Halacha, at least in theory, a woman - and
> also a man - is supposed to resist to the point of death, at least if
> this is a full fledged arayos, like if a woman is married, although a
> person can resist to the limit and still be overcome and live.
>
> This is, after all, one of the three things we are supposed to die
> rather than do ...
> Maybe the actual practical halacha is, it is better to resist, but
> wrong to commit suicide to avoid it but, whatever you do, nobody is
> going to blame you.
This din of yehareig ve'al ya'avor (to be killed rather than commit a sin --Mod.)
applies to a person being asked actively to do the act. A woman is defined as
karka olam (passive) and does not have to sacrifice her life to avoid being raped.
The same, for that matter, would apply to a man being raped. The victim is
blameless under the heading of ones (compulsion) - only acts done voluntarily,
whether deliberately in contravention of halachah (meizid) or through erroneous
opinion as to their permissibility (shogeg), are punishable whether by human
courts or the hand of heaven.
Martin Stern
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Frank Silbermann <frank_silbermann@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 08:01 AM
Subject: Halacha when threatened with rape
Sammy Finkelman wrote (MJ 60#08):
> I think that according to Halacha, at least in theory, a woman
> - and also a man - is supposed to resist (rape) to the point of death,
> at least if this is a full fledged arayos, like if a woman is married,
> although a person can resist to the limit and still be overcome and live.
"If a woman is married" -- wouldn't this make a difference only
if one had reason to assume that the rapist was Jewish?
(Somewhere I got the idea that the child of a gentile man
could not be a mamzer -- unless of course if the mother were already
a mamzer herself.)
A side point: If we are encouraged to resist to the death, indeed,
sometimes even required to do so, would this not make the rapist
a rodef whom we would be permitted to kill to save ourselves?
I presume there is no question about killing a rapist who was
threatening murder should we resist -- and all the more so
nowadays in the age of AIDS.
But the above implies that one could kill the rapist if necessary
to prevent the rape even if he were only trying to manhandle us
via superior strength (even without relying on "the threat of AIDS).
Frank Silbermann Memphis, Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Michael Rogovin <mrogovin118@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 09:01 AM
Subject: Halacha when threatened with rape
Sammy Finkelman (MJ 60#08) asks about martyrdom in the case of rape. IIRC, one
is not required to martyr oneself in the case of oness (duress) except when the
sin is in public and would be a chillul haShem (desecration of God's name). I
believe it is discussed in (among other places) M. Ketubot in the first perek
(as an aside in relation to the local ruler's custom to rape new brides) and in
detail in Rambam MT Deot.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Daniel Cohn <4danielcohn@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 10:01 AM
Subject: Halacha when threatened with rape
Martin Stern wrote in MJ 60#08:
> AFAIK this is incorrect. Halachah does not allow governments to carry out
> capital punishment except where it is mandated by halachah itself. Dina
> demalchuta dina applies only to financial matters and enactments for the
> general wellbeing of society such as traffic regulation etc.
I don't think this is accurate. The Gemara in Yevamot 90B brings in the name
of Rabi Elazar Ben Yaakov that the Beit Din is allowed to impose a
punishment without it being specified in the Torah (beit din makin veonshin
shelo min haTorah).
Regards,
Daniel
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Rabbi Meir Wise <Meirhwise@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 04:01 PM
Subject: Megilat Sefer
I am told that there was a hyphen missing in the URL (whatever that
is) for the book -- here it is again:
[Mod. note: I had checked Rabbi Wise's original URL before OKing his message for
publication. To ensure the necessary hyphen doesn't again 'disappear', I'm
listing below a "tiny" version of the Amazon-Website URL.]
>>> http://tinyurl.com/3c2buxc <<<
Wishing everybody an enjoyable and enlightening read.
Meir Wise
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Akiva Miller <kennethgmiller@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 09:01 AM
Subject: Pictures of women
Richard Steinberger (MJ 60#08) asked:
> One chareidi newspaper in the US cut out Hilary Clinton from a
> photo showing the presidential Ops room during the attack on Bin
> Laden. The question has been raised: where does it say in Poskim
> that you cannot have a photo of a woman in a newspaper?
If there are indeed any sources which declare it forbidden to publish a picture
of a modestly-dressed woman (as the Sec'y of State was, in that photo), I'd like
to see it. However, I believe that is totally superfluous and beside the point.
I say this because it seems to me that even if there are no authorities at all
who forbid the publication of such a photo, it is still something which the
publishers might choose to do. I am not addressing the ethics of doctoring the
photo itself. What I am addressing is this: It seems that when a portion of the
community is perceived as ultra-Orthodox, and they refrain from a particular
action, others jump to the conclusion that this action must be "forbidden", at
least according to some authorities.
On the contrary, I say. It might not be forbidden at all. It might simply be
that the customers of that newspaper PREFER not to see photos of women, and
therefore the newspaper caters to their customer base by removing the women from
photos that they print.
The newspaper that did the doctoring issued a lengthy apology, which included
this: "Publishing a newspaper is a big responsibility, and our policies are
guided by a Rabbinical Board. Because of laws of modesty, we are not allowed to
publish pictures of women, and we regret if this gives an impression of [being]
disparaging to women, which is certainly never our intention. We apologize if
this was seen as offensive." (You can google that text to read the full
statement.)
I concede that the words "we are not allowed" gives the impression that one
might find such a prohibition somewhere within the published volumes of Jewish
law, as Richard Steinberger asked. But it is also possible that "we are not
allowed" merely refers to the policies of the newspaper's Rabbinical Board,
which may be nothing more than a reflection of the sensitivities of the customer
base, as I explained above.
Akiva Miller
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Martin Stern <md.stern@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 02:01 AM
Subject: Selective justice?
A comparison of the treatment by the US court of Dominique Strauss-Kahn with
that of John Demaniuk in Germany is disturbing. The former was refused bail
even though the chance of such a high profile person disappearing is
minimal. The latter was released on bail pending appeal against a CONVICTION,
which is unlikely to succeed, for being at the very least an accessory to
the mass murder of thousands at Sobibor and whom many sympathisers might
well wish to help escape.
Is the fact that both Dominique Strauss-Kahn and John Demaniuk's victims
appear to be Jewish at all relevant?
Martin Stern
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Josh Backon <backon@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 05:01 AM
Subject: Sins and non-sins
Martin Stern wrote (MJ 60#08):
> This is a slight oversimplification but the crucial point is that abortion
> (for Jews at least) is not considered murder though it is not permitted
> without restriction. The circumstances of each case have to be examined by a
> competent halachic authority and any decision cannot necessarily be
> extrapolated to other apparently similar ones. It is NOT the case that a
> woman has the unrestricted right to dispose of an unwanted pregnancy.
ABORTION
The first question is the source of the prohibition. According to most
Rishonim and Acharonim, aborting a fetus is biblically prohibited if
there is no danger to the mother. (See: Maharam Shick YD 155; Tzofnat
Paneach 59; Achiezer III 65; Ohr Sameach Hilchot Issurei Biah 3:2;
Bet Yitzchak YD II 162; Sdei Chemed Maarechet Aleph Klallim 52;
Yabia Omer IV EH 1; Iggrot Moshe CM II 69). There are those
(minority position) who feel the prohibition is only rabbinical
(RAN Chulin 58a d"h ul'inyan; Maharash Engel Chelek V 88,
and Chelek VII 170; R. Chaim Palaggi in Chaim VeShalom I 40; Bet
Yehuda Mahari Ayash EH 14; Mishpetei Uzziel CM 46 # 4).
DIN RODEF
The only way therapeutic abortion is permissible is if there is danger
to the mother and this is via DIN RODEF (see: Rambam, SEMAG, Rabbenu Bachya
as explained in the Chazon Ish on the Rambam Hilchot Rotzeach).
FETUS UNDER 40 DAYS
Most authorities permit aborting a fetus under 40 days after gestation
(see: Bet Shlomo CM 132; Torat Chesed EH 42 # 33; Sridei Eish III 127;
Achiezer III 65).
DANGER TO THE MOTHER
Any life-threatening danger to the mother REQUIRES an abortion whether as
a result of the pregnancy or with a concomitant medical disorder (see:
Shevet Halevi V 193; Kanah Bashem CM 127 [even if there is only a *safek*
(doubt)]. Even in the case where the danger is not immediate but only later
on in the pregnancy an abortion may be permitted (Achiezer III 72 oht gimmel).
Even if the danger to the mother involves sakanat eivar [limb or ear, etc]
(Torat Chesed EH 44 oht 32; Mishpetei Uzziel III CM 46).
Regarding exacerbation of poor health but not life-threatening danger, some
permit (Maharit I 99; Tzitz Eliezer VII 48) while others prohibit (Yabia
Omer IV EH 1; Iggrot Moshe CM II 69 [although the Yabia Omer would consider
nonsurgical abortion as in oral potion that would induce abortion).
MENTAL ILLNESS
The Levush Mordechai (CM 39) permits an abortion if the woman is psychotic; the
Torat Hayoledet Chapter 60 #4 permits in a case of serious depression. Actually,
the only decisor who ruled that psychological health per se is a factor in
permitting abortion is the LEVUSHEI MORDECHAI Choshen Mishpat 39 and even here,
it was in reference to actual psychosis, not minor depression of the woman. In
order to permit an abortion, there must be a concomitant illness of the woman
that would be greatly exacerbated by the pregnancy.
SOCIOECONOMIC REASONS
Prohibited by all authorities.
MAMZER
The YAAVETZ (Chelek 1:43) permits in the case where a MAMZER ("bastard": this is
*not* a child of an unwed mother but is defined as a child born to a mother who
was prohibited to have relations with another man, e.g. she was already married,
or the child was the progeny of an incestuous relationship) would be
born.
RAPE
In the case of rape, it is permissible (if done within 72 hours) to abort the
fetus (see also the Mishpetei Uzziel [Chelek 3, Choshen Mishpat, #47]).
ABORTION METHOD
On the other hand, the method of abortion also plays a factor:
destructive operations (e.g. D&C) vs. drug induced abortion
(prostaglandin pessary) with drug induced abortions seen as being more
lenient (issur d'rabbanan)
According to the MAHARIT 97, the prohibition of abortion is CHABALA
to the mother, following the opinion of the RAMAH on Sanhedrin 72b
and the Meiri on Bava Kama 91a, and the Rambam (not the explanation of
Rav Chaim Brisker !! whose explanation was not accepted by the Sridei
Eish Choshen Mishpat 162).
Josh Backon
<backon@...>
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Frank Silbermann <frank_silbermann@...>
Date: Wed, May 18,2011 at 09:01 AM
Subject: Sins and non-sins
Martin Stern Vol.60 #08 wrote:
> Where the life of a non-Jewish woman is in danger, abortion should be
> permitted since the foetus is considered to be a rodef (as if it were trying
> to kill its mother). Technically, it might be better if the procedure is
> carried out by a Jewish doctor to whom the prohibition of killing it (nefesh
> adam be'adam) may not apply with the same severity though in practice a
> competent halachic authority should first be consulted.
In what sense would killing someone else's rodef be more problematic
for a gentile to do? Long ago on this list someone mentioned a source
that permitted a Jew to do so -- but I don't know whether the source
forbade gentiles from doing so or merely was silent on that issue.
Sammy Finkelman (MJ 60#07) wrote:
>> The most you can say I would guess, without looking at anything, is that a
>> government has the authority to prohibit abortion and even give the death
>> penaltywithout the people responsible for such a law committing a sin and
>> similarly a government can prohibit many things upon pain of death without
>> it being considered a sin.
on which Martin Stern (MJ 60 #08) commented:
> AFAIK this is incorrect. Halachah does not allow governments to carry out
> capital punishment except where it is mandated by halachah itself.
Don't the laws of kingship allow a king to put to death anyone he chooses,
for any reason or none at all? In what sense does halacha distinguish
between kings and governments acting in accordance with the kings will?
(Presumably, in a democracy, the people as a collective are king.)
Frank Silbermann Memphis, Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------------------------
End of Volume 60 Issue 9
