Volume 62 Number 90
Produced: Wed, 25 May 16 13:57:55 -0400
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
"Kinyan" in the Context of Marriage
[Dr Russell Jay Hendel]
Concubinage Relationship
[Dr Russell Jay Hendel]
Homosexuality (2)
[Lisa Liel Dr Russell Jay Hendel]
Sexual consent in marriage (was "Kinyan" in the Context of Marriage)
[Leah S. R. Gordon]
Some thoughts on An'im Zemirot
[Martin Stern]
Specific or General Prohibition (was Homosexuality)
[Leah S. R. Gordon]
Status of an Eved Ivri (was Concubinage Relationship)
[Martin Stern]
Techeles (Tyrian purple?) and Kala Ilan (indigo)
[Saul Mashbaum]
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From: Dr Russell Jay Hendel <rashiyomi@...>
Date: Mon, May 23,2016 at 06:01 PM
Subject: "Kinyan" in the Context of Marriage
Paradoxically, the citation Yisrael Medad (MJ 62#89) uses to query me contains
two statements and answer his question. In citing Hil. Deot 5:4-5 we have
> Although a man's wife is permitted to him at all times (A),
> it is fitting that a wise man behave with holiness. He should not frequent
his wife like a rooster ... (B)
Statement (A) is a statement of rights. Statement (B) is something "fitting",
something beyond the strict letter of the law. (I could go through each
statement in Hil. Deot 5:4-5 and cite comparable statements elsewhere in the Rambam.
I could do the same for the citation Yisrael made from the code of Jewish law.
My sole purpose here is to show that we must differentiate between *right*,
*requirement* and *fitting-ideals*. I did not think it necessary to make the
posting exhaustive.
Later on Yisrael states:
> I think the standard of "Jewish law" is not as RJH would have us think
But I never stated (A) as a *standard;" I stated it as a right. Furthermore, it
was I, not Yisrael, who stated the standard, and not from some idealistic goal
in character laws, but from a Biblical requirement, a positive commandment, for
a husband to "fully satisfy" his wife during intimacy according to the
frequencies listed in Jewish law (MJ 62#88). (All I pointed out was that after
fulfilling this obligation the man had certain rights of ownership; I never said
this was ideal; I also never said this overrode his requirements to his wife; my
point was that some men, at some times in their marriage, may need this and it
is permitted). I, of course, have no objection to people like Yisrael mentioning
ideals and goals but they also (like strict laws) should not be characterized as
standards.
Although I (briefly) answered Yisrael, at this point in the thread, when I have
to repeat myself, I don't see value in further continuing this. I would urge
people to read my postings in their entirety
Russell Jay Hendel
Rashiyomi.com
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From: Dr Russell Jay Hendel <rashiyomi@...>
Date: Mon, May 23,2016 at 06:01 PM
Subject: Concubinage Relationship
Susan Buxfield (MJ 62#89) states:
> Dr Russell Jay Hendel's narrow interpretation of RamBaM's Ishut 1:4 (MJ 62#80
> and earlier posts) seems to contend that there are only two types of women a
> male can have relationships with, a Kadeishah (prostitute) or a Mekudeshet
> (married woman),
It was not my interpretation but that of the Rav's (Rabbi Soloveitchick).
Also, it was not an interpretation of Ishut 1:4 but of Ishut 1:1 and 1:4. I
don't know in what sense what the Rav said is narrow. The Rav said that
according to Rambam there are two prohibitions against extra-marital sex, the
prohibition of prostitution (Ishut 1:4) and the prohibition implied by the
obligation to perform a marital acquisition act, (Ishut 1:1) while according to
Raavad there is only one prohibition, Ishut 1:1 on which Raavad does not dissent
(I offered my own opinion on the Raavad but that is not relevant to this
discussion). I reported this argument as an oral transmission I heard from the
Rav in a Talmud lecture. My purpose was to clarify biblical issues related to
this discussion.
I clearly pointed out that the Raavad is silent on Ishut 1:1 showing agreement.
Hence Raavad would hold a Pilegesh prohibited. (The Raavad's contribution is
that there is no violation of a negative violation). I also offered the insight
that a King can take a pilegesh because royal consorts are prohibited on other
men and hence the Kings relations have a similar acquisition effect to using a
ring.
Here are Susan's other questions:
> while ignoring other places in the RaMBaM that permit relationships with
> women such as a Meuyedet (Amah Ivriah), Meyuchedet (Pilegesh) and, in the
> case of a Mamzer, a Shifchah Kena'anit (a non-jewish female slave).
I never addressed Amah Ivriah, a female minor sold as a slave because of the
poverty of the family. But the Rambam explicitly says that she is treated like
any other female. She does require a marital act of acquisition and consent. The
initial money transfer (when she was sold as a slave serves this purpose, like
our modern ring) (Rambam Avduth, 4:7-8).
Perhaps Susan had some other authority in mind. It would be useful if sources
were mentioned. Some people have suggested that the whole point of the
institution of female minor slavery was to allow Jewish marriage before they
attain puberty and are exposed to non-Jewish forces.
Susan seems to indicate that there are ways a Mamzer (illegitimate) can live
with a Shifchah Kena'anit (non-Jewish female slave). I don't see that any place
in the Rambam (Since this is new I would be happy to answer it if there are
sources).
Dr. Russell Jay Hendel
Rashiyomi.com
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From: Lisa Liel <lisa@...>
Date: Mon, May 23,2016 at 04:01 AM
Subject: Homosexuality
Martin Stern wrote (MJ 62#89):
> Dr Russell Jay Hendel wrote (MJ 62#88):
>
>> Martin Stern (MJ 62#87) mentions certain (non-Jewish) suggestions that the
>> prohibition of homosexuality in Lev. 18:22 is only a prohibition of homosexual
>> relations connected with idolatry, a sin mentioned in Lev. 18:21. Martin then
>> gives an exhaustive analysis and invites comments.
> Unfortunately some Jewish persons, mainly Reform et al. but also those of
> the "gay Orthodox" persuasion, try to make this argument.
Not all of us. That's an argument that's been put forward by Steve Greenberg,
the so-called "first openly gay Orthodox [sic] rabbi". Labeling his faulty
reasoning as the view of gay and lesbian Orthodox Jews simply empowers him and
his ilk.
No one who takes the Torah and halakha seriously disputes the fact that the
prohibition of mishkav zachor in the Torah is a prohibition of male-male anal
sex -- period.
Lisa
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From: Dr Russell Jay Hendel <rashiyomi@...>
Date: Wed, May 25,2016 at 08:01 AM
Subject: Homosexuality
Martin Stern (MJ 62#89) wrote:
> Dr Russell Jay Hendel wrote (MJ 62#88):
>
>> Martin Stern (MJ 62#87) mentions certain (non-Jewish) suggestions that the
>> prohibition of homosexuality in Lev. 18:22 is only a prohibition of
>> homosexual relations connected with idolatry, a sin mentioned in Lev. 18:21.
>> Martin then gives an exhaustive analysis and invites comments.
> ...
>> I just wanted to make some extra points:
>>
>> 1) The Molech ritual mentioned in Lev. 18:21 involves passing children
>> through a fire and does not involve any homosexual practices. Consequently,
>> one can't see in the juxtaposition of Lev. 18:21-22 a prohibition of
>> homosexuality related to idolatry since the biblical text is not speaking
>> about it.
>
> I fear that Dr Hendel has missed the point: neither I nor the Anglican
> theologian to whom I referred were suggesting this. The point he was making
> was that by inserting the molekh prohibition before those of sodomy and
> bestiality, the Torah may have wanted to indicate that the latter were
> separate in nature from the preceding transgressions (hefsek ha'inyan) and
> were, therefore, basically idolatrous rather than sexual. My analysis was to
> counter THIS perception.
The Anglican theologian's suggestion, which he is trying to counter, seems to be
that the three prohibitions
i) passing your children through fire
ii) male homosexual relations
iii) female bestiality
form a new paragraph with some other theme: idolatrous vs. sexual.
There are four additional answers to this:
1) If it were a separate paragraph, there would be a paragraph marker in the
Masoretic Text. In Torah Scrolls there are end-of-line paragraph markers (there
is space until the end of the line) and 9-space paragraph markers (9 spaces, a
sort of indentation, before the next paragraph). The previous end-of-line
paragraph marker occurs at Lev. 18:1 and the next end-of-line marker occurs at
Lev. 19:1. So indeed Lev. 18 is to be thought of as one paragraph. Consequently,
the "paragraph theme" is sexual prohibitions.
2) The paragraph marking is in the ABA format of Lev 18:
Lev. 18:1-5 prohibits Egyptian practices.
Lev. 18:24-30 prohibits Canaanite practices.
In between are listed a collection of prohibitions some more typically Egyptian
and some more typically Canaanite.
In my article Biblical Formatting (Jewish Bible Quarterly 35(1)), I point out
that such ABA formats indicate a unified paragraph with common themes inside the
paragraph. In other words the theme of the chapter is sexual prohibitions and
all verses in it point to this theme.
3) There are other biblical paragraphs which have stray verses. This is a
biblical style with a particular purpose.
We can compare Lev. 18 with Lev. 23. Lev. 23 is a paragraph on Jewish holidays.
Lev. 23:22 deviates with a one-verse reminder about charity laws (leaving
gleanings for the poor). Rashi (ad loc.) explains that it is done to compare
charity to the holidays. Observing the holidays is as holy and good as giving
charity. The particular place in the chapter is not important. The idea of
comparison is important.
We can transfer this idea to Lev. 18, a chapter dealing with sexual prohibitions
which also has a stray verse prohibiting the idolatrous practice of passing
children through fire (Lev. 18:21). The idea would then be that idolatry and the
sexual prohibitions are equally abominable.
4) Finally, there is an element of abnormality in Lev. 18:21 - passing children
through fire - and the following two verses prohibiting male homosexulaity and
female bestiality. All these three laws have an element of abnormality. The
other sexual prohibitions in Lev. 18 deal with normal opposite gender
same-species relations. Sodomy and bestiality therefore are analogous in this
repect to the idolatrous practice of passing one's children through fire - it is
abnormal since parents normally have pity on their children.
Why emphasize this? I might think that the destruction of the land (Lev. 18:25)
only applies to sins of passion like same species opposite gender incest.
However I wouldn't think that rarer forms of sexual misconduct, such as
bestiality, which is abnormal and hence rarer, would lead to the destruction of
the land. Hence we are informed otherwise.
Dr Russell Jay Hendel
Rashiyomi.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Leah S. R. Gordon <leah@...>
Date: Mon, May 23,2016 at 07:01 AM
Subject: Sexual consent in marriage (was "Kinyan" in the Context of Marriage)
Russell Jay Hendel wrote (MJ 62#88):
> Under Jewish law, if a married woman gets into bed with her husband, she grants
> him the right to for example have unnatural relations (even though his wife
> expected the opposite) or to kiss where he wants (even though his wife
> objects). In other words, the husband has purchased certain rights on the
> woman's body. He has the right to do things even though she objects.
I maintain that this is inaccurate to the point of offensiveness. Others have
addressed the halakha (including Rambam) on this point - who by the way seems to
agree with our modern consent standard of "sustained enthusiastic participatory
consent" per the quote brought by Yisrael Medad (MJ 62#89), "amidst their mutual
consent and joy".
I feel it is critical that again at this juncture I remind Dr. Hendel that he
lives in the United States, and if he follows what he has laid out, he will be
in violation of our rape/assault laws.
Furthermore, I think that there is a problem in Mr. Hendel continuing to write
on MJ as though women don't have agency, and as though men are supposed to
decide WOMEN'S personal status and physical activity.
Leah S. R. Gordon
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Martin Stern <md.stern@...>
Date: Sun, May 22,2016 at 02:01 AM
Subject: Some thoughts on An'im Zemirot
Dr. Russell Jay Hendel wrote (MJ 62#88):
> Martin Stern (MJ 62#87) offers a new insight on why minor girls should be
> prohibited from leading the congregation in An'im Zemirot. Martin concedes
> that the issue is
>
>> not whether it is a prayer per se
>
> but rather
>> I think that the last two words "saying it" are crucial. The problem is with
>> minor girls SINGING An'im Zemirot, something they will be prohibited from
>> doing in the hearing of men when they are adults and which men may even be
>> prohibited from hearing while the girls are still minors according to many
>> authorities
>
> This is an excellent point that has not been brought up previously.
> ...
> Let us now analyze the applicability of this singing argument to An'im
> Zemirot.
> As is well known, there are (some) authorities that permit mixed singing of
> women and men especially when no particular woman's voice is identifiable. A
> common application of this permissibility is in allowing men and women to sing
> Sabbath songs together at Sabbath tables. I quickly emphasize, that not all
> authorities allow this.
>
> Let us return to An'im Zemiroth. Does the congregation sing An'im Zemirot
> together, men and women? Or, are there Sabbath meals where men and women sing
> together?
>
> If the answer to any of these questions is yes then there is no reason why a
> group of minors - boys and girls - can't lead the congregation in An'im
> Zemirot.
There may be some leniency possible if a group of minors -- boys and girls --
are singing together, but I thought we were arguing about a single girl
leading the congregation in An'im Zemirot.
> Note a further point of permissibility. At a minor age, gender is not
> identifiable by voice. So children groups singing are not problematic if you
> follow the group permissibility rule.
>
> Here is still another perspective: There is no difference between a group of
> girls and boys leading the congregation in songs during a 3rd Sabbath meal and
> them leading the congregation during An'im Zemirot. Here, I am equating An'im
> Zemirot with a Sabbath song.
I think this equation is questionable. What might be acceptable in a private
Shabbat meal may be inappropriate in the confines of a synagogue because of
the latter's greater sanctity.
> One final point. Throughout this thread, there has been a discussion on
> whether minor girls should be allowed to sing An'im Zemirot or not? But the
> broader question, how should women be allowed to participate in the Sabbath
> service has not been addressed. As a simple example, there should be nothing
> wrong with even single minor girls leading the congregation in announcements
> prior to Kiddush (The prohibition of hearing women sing does not apply to
> talking).
This last example is quite correct but hardly relevant, since making such
announcements has no religious significance -- even an adult woman could make
them though, in certain circles, this would be frowned upon as contravening
"kol kevod bat Melekh penimah". Whether it could be extended to any formal
participation in the Sabbath service is much more controversial.
Martin Stern
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Leah S. R. Gordon <leah@...>
Date: Mon, May 23,2016 at 07:01 AM
Subject: Specific or General Prohibition (was Homosexuality)
Martin Stern wrote (MJ 62#89):
> I fear that Dr Hendel has missed the point: neither I nor the Anglican
> theologian to whom I referred were suggesting this. The point he was making was
> that by inserting the molekh prohibition before those of sodomy and bestiality,
> the Torah may have wanted to indicate that the latter were separate in nature
> from the preceding transgressions (hefsek ha'inyan) and were, therefore,
> basically idolatrous rather than sexual. My analysis was to counter THIS
> perception.
It seems to me (Leah) that our goal isn't to "counter" a perception that might
go against random feelings, but rather to find out textually what is meant
le'chatchila. This interpretation of his friend is intriguing to me, and
somewhat convincing, actually. We often have cases where the Torah becomes more
or less specific and that has implications in halakha, and we also have cases
where the juxtaposition of mitzvot is certainly counted as significant.
Leah S. R. Gordon
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Martin Stern <md.stern@...>
Date: Mon, May 23,2016 at 04:01 PM
Subject: Status of an Eved Ivri (was Concubinage Relationship)
Susan Buxfield wrote (MJ 62#89):
> ... in the case of a Mamzer, a Shifchah Kena'anit (a non-jewish female
> slave).
This is a common misapprehension. Both a Shifchah Kena'anit and an Eved
Kena'ani are Jews insofar as they have undergone a form of conversion on
being bought. Admittedly they are on a lower level and are exempt from
certain time-bound positive mitsvot but, on being freed, they become full
Jews like any other convert.
If they had refused to accept the mitsvot incumbent on their status, the
purchaser could not keep them and would have had to resell them to a
non-Jew.
The terms are used to contrast them with an Eved Ivri or an Amah Ivriah who
are full Jews but have certain obligations to their masters, a bit like an
indentured servant, but go free automatically in due course. Unlike the
former, their status is dependent on the operation of Yovel, and so cannot
exist nowadays.
Martin Stern
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Saul Mashbaum <saul.mashbaum@...>
Date: Wed, May 25,2016 at 12:01 PM
Subject: Techeles (Tyrian purple?) and Kala Ilan (indigo)
Sammy Finkelman wrote (MJ 62#86):
> I had read - the last I heard - that actually the two colors, Techeles (Tyrian
> purple) and Kala Ilan (indigo), came from the same chemical, and that's why
> they are so hard to distinguish
This presents me with a perfect opportunity to share a drasha of R. Yosef Dov HaLevi Soloveitchik ztz"l on
the subject of Techelet and Kala Ilan. Kala Ilan is a dye from a vegetable source which produces a color
virtually identical to "genuine" techelet, a dye from an animal source. One may well inquire why the
Torah insisted that the much more plentiful and accessible, and therefore much less expensive, Kala Ilan
dye not be used in tzitzit, demanding rather the more costly Techlet dye.
The Rambam says in Hilchot Tzitzit (2:1) (free translation) "The techelet referred to in tzitzit must be the
dye of a known color, which maintains its beauty and does not change." The difference between kala ilan
and techelet is not the initial color, but how color-fast the dye is. Kala ilan dye fades with time, something
dyed with techelet retains its beautiful color.
We know that a crucial element in our service of Hashem is commitment, devotion, steadfastness. We are
enjoined not to let our commitment fade, dim, become washed-out, but to with great effort maintain it,
both over time and in trying circumstances. The beautiful, long-lasting techelet "sheomedet b'yofyah velo
tishtaneh", unlike the short-lived kala ilan dye, is a perfect symbol of service of Hashem, and thus the
Torah says about it "you shall see it and remember all of the commandments."
Saul Mashbaum
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End of Volume 62 Issue 90
