Volume 10 Number 96
                       Produced: Wed Dec 29 11:28:16 1993

Subjects Discussed In This Issue: 

         [Avi Feldblum]
Friday Night Kiddush for Women (6)
         [Gedalyah Berger, Yacov Barber, Hayim Hendeles, Jeremy
Nussbaum, Martha Greenberg, Joel Goldberg]
Hidden Codes in the Torah
         [Rick Turkel]


From: mljewish (Avi Feldblum)
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 93 11:17:07 -0500
Subject: Administrivia

First I would like to extend my condolences on behalf of myself and the
mail-jewish membership to our fellow member and often contributer,
Aryeh Frimer. Aryeh's father passed away last week. Rabbi Frimer was a
prof. at Brooklyn College, a hillel director there, a national
coordinator for Hillel in the NY area, and an international director of
the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture.

May HaMakom (Hashem) comfort you amongst the mourners of Zion and

The main topic of this issue is one that I have enjoyed, having given a
shiur on it in the past. The range of what the various reashonim and
acharonim require for satisfying the Torah level requirement is quite
amazing to me. Also mentioned briefly is the position of the Noda
Beyehuda, who if I remember correctly appears to say that kol yisrael
aravim (defined in one of the postings below) does not work from a man
to a women. One interesting practical application of this issue, is that
since a woman has at least the same level of obligation as the man, the
woman can make kiddush for the man. This practice is becoming more
popular in many observant homes.

Avi Feldblum
mail-jewish Moderator


From: Gedalyah Berger <gberger@...>
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 15:55:25 -0500
Subject: Re: Friday Night Kiddush for Women

> <MINDY@...> (Mindy Schimmel)
> Subject: Friday Night Kiddush for Women
> Now, let us assume that a man has davened Ma`ariv (perhaps in shul) on
> Friday night.  Let us further assume that his wife has stayed home and
> has not davened at all.  He then, has fulfilled his obligation
> de-Oraita, while she is still obligated de-Oraita to say Kiddush.  How
> then can he, whose obligation to Kiddush is only de-Rabbanan, say
> Kiddush for her, whose obligation to Kiddush is de-Oraita?
> <MINDY@...> (Mindy Schimmel)
> Subject: Friday Night Kiddush for Women
> Now, let us assume that a man has davened Ma`ariv (perhaps in shul) on
> Friday night.  Let us further assume that his wife has stayed home and
> has not davened at all.  He then, has fulfilled his obligation
> de-Oraita, while she is still obligated de-Oraita to say Kiddush.  How
> then can he, whose obligation to Kiddush is only de-Rabbanan, say
> Kiddush for her, whose obligation to Kiddush is de-Oraita?

(I apologize for the lack of sources; I'm piecing this together from 
memory from shi`urim I heard in high school.)

First, just as a point of information, what the actual chiyyuv
mide'oraita of kiddush is is a machloket rishonim.  Some say one must
drink the wine; some say one must say it over wine but does not have to
drink it; and some say (the quoted position) that wine is not necessary
at all mide'oraita.  In any case, the husband may make kiddush for his
wife, based on the halakhic principle "yatza, motzi," i.e., "one who has
already fulfilled his obligation may perform a mitzvah on behalf of one
who has not."  The rule of "kol mi she'eno mechuyyav bedavar eno motzi
et harabbim yedei chovatan" (anyone who is not obligated in a mitzvah
can not perform it on behalf of others) is only applicable to an actual
eno mechuyyav bedavar - one who is not obligated at all - and not to
someone who is mechuyyav but has already fulfilled his obligation.

Some rishonim associate "yatza, motzi" with the concept of "kol Yisra'el
`arevim zeh lazeh" (loosely - all Jews are responsible for each other);
they say that yatza motzi because a person has not really completely
fulfilled his obligation as long as there is still a Jew in the world
who has not performed the mitzvah, so he too is still chayyav.

One other note: The principle of "shomea` ke`oneh" (one who hears is
equivalent to one who speaks) might also be operative in the kiddush
case.  In other words, the husband in the above case really might not
have to be motzi his wife; by listening, she is considered to have said
it herself.  (This, however, might not work unless she too has a cup of

[I then emailed Gedalyah a question on what he wrote, and he then checked
and returned with some sources from his notes. Thanks! Mod]

I just went back to check my notes (from a shi`ur of Rabbi Yonasan Sacks
in MTA in 1989).  The gemara in Nazir (3b-4a) questions the suggestion
that a nazir may not drink the wine of kiddush, because mushba` ve`omed
mehar Sinai hu.  This implies that drinking the wine is mide'oraita.
Rashi there (4a top) indeed says this is the case.  Tosafot there (d"h
mai) argue and say that the wine is not mide'oraita.  Tosafot in
Pesachim (106a d"h zokhrehu, end) mention the third option, that saying
it over wine is mide'oraita but drinking the wine is not.

The Rambam does indeed pasken (Hil. Shabbat 29) that wine is not needed
at all mide'oraita. The Dagul Merevavah (271) (by the ba`al Noda`
Biyhudah) actually says that according to the Rambam the wife is not
yotzet in the case we've been discussing because the husband was yotze
with ma`ariv.

One other interesting opinion, once I have my notes out: The Minchat
Chinukh (31) says that one can't be yotze with ma`ariv anyway, because
(see Pesachim 117b) in order to be yotze one must be mazkir yetzi'at

Gedalyah Berger
Yeshiva College / RIETS

From: <barbery@...> (Yacov Barber)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 05:30:07 -0500
Subject: Friday Night Kiddush for Women

The question was raised, if a man fulfills his Torah obligation of
Kiddush by davening Maariv Friday night, and when he comes home and
recites Kiddush over wine he is only fullfilling a Rabbinic obligation.
How can he say Kiddush for his wife who (has not davened and) has a
Torah obligation to hear Kiddush.
    Actually this query was raised by the Dogul Mervovo (this commentary
is found on the side of the Shulchan Aruch) siman (sect.)271.  The
Chasam Sofer in his responsa (O. Chaim sect. 21 & 143) writes that most
probably the man has intention not to fulfill his obligation during
davening but rather on Kiddush recited over the wine, which would
therefore place him on the same level as his wife (i.e. both obligated
Min Hatorah ) Rabbi Akivah Eiger in sect. 271 writes that when the man
comes home from shul and the family wish one another a Gut Shabbos, one
has fullfilled the Torah obligation of saying Kiddush.  Rabbi Meir Arik
in his responsa Imrei Yosher (vol.1 sect. 22) writes that when a woman
lights Shabbos candles and she praises Shabbos at that time in her
Tefillah, she fulfills her obligation Min Hatorah in relation to
Kiddush.  I once heard that whenever Harav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach Shlita,
would travel on a bus Motzei Shabbos he would always say Shavua Tov to
the driver who would naturally respond Shavua Tov. (This being based on
R' A. Eigers line of reasoning.)

Yacov Barber <barbery@...>

From: Hayim Hendeles <hayim@...>
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 11:24:28 -0800
Subject: Re: Friday Night Kiddush for Women

Someone showed me a response from Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Siman 271) who
asks this exact question. He answers that one does not need to mention
Kiddush specifically to fulfill the requirement, but any mention of
Shabbos, fulfills the biblical requirement. When the man comes home
from shul, and says "Good Shabbos" to his wife, she thereby fulfills
her obligation. The Chaye Adam (Siman 22) offers a similiar logic, in
that women generally have an acdepted custom to recite several prayers
about the Shabbos after candle lighting, and with this, she has
fulfilled her Biblical obligation.

Hence men and women both have an equal obligation M'drabanan to recite
Kiddush on wine.

The Chasam Sofer in Siman 21 and Siman 143 gives a different answer -
that men have an [implict] intention not to fulfill their requirement
during Maariv, but only on the wine.

Hayim Hendeles

From: <jeremy@...> (Jeremy Nussbaum)
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 93 10:12:59 -0500
Subject: Friday Night Kiddush for Women

This is a general question, and applies to other areas.  In a mitzvah
for which there is both a rabbinic and a Torah obligation which can be
fulfilled in the same exact manner, can one with a rabbinic obligation
help one with a Torah obligation fulfil it?  It applies to Kiddush, and
also to Birkhat Hamazon.  The Torah obligation in BH is if one "is
satiated."  (V'achalta v'SAVATA ubeirachta.)  We generally rule that the
rabbinic obligation is (sufficiently) similar to the Torah obligation to
enable this type of vicarious fulfilment.  Thus a man who has eaten an
olive's worth can say BH for one who has eaten his fill.  The issue of
women fulfilling men's obligation wrt BH is more complicated, since
there is a doubt as to women's basic obligation; is it rabbinic or
Torah, and the reasoning behind it.  In fact, until "recently" (well,
half a millenium or so ago), women most likely did not use the same text
as men for BH and left out the section about Brit and Torah in the
second blessing.

From: <marthag@...> (Martha Greenberg)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 07:59:22 -0500
Subject: Friday Night Kiddush for Women

In the case of a man saying kiddush for his wife, the concept of "eishto
k'gufo" (his wife is like himself) applies.  This means that her
obligation counts as his, and if she has not heard kiddush, he can say
it for her, and it counts as if he were himself obligated as she is.

Martha Greenberg

From: <goldberg@...> (Joel Goldberg)
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 93 03:31:25 -0500
Subject: Friday Night Kiddush for Women

 From the shiur that I attended on this I remember the following. A woman
would make kiddush if the only other males were katanim--because of the
obligation level mentioned above. The "best" reason for the man still
being able to make kiddush for the woman is that "kol yisrael arevim zeh
le zeh," until all of Israel has performed a particular mitzvah, no one
has performed it (completely?) An example given was that some men will
go to other Jewish houses on seder night and "perform" the seder for
them--the householders having their obligation fulfilled by one who
has already had a seder in his own house.


From: <rmt51@...> (Rick Turkel)
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 93 11:27:41 EST
Subject: Hidden Codes in the Torah

	In m.j v10#59, Mike Gerver writes, in answer to one of my
previous posts:

>                                               Rick makes the same
>assumption that most people (including myself) make before reading
>Witztum's paper, that the authors have massaged the text until they get
>something to come out, but that it is not statistically significant, and
>one could do the same thing with any text. In fact, the whole point of
>the paper is to show that it is statistically significant, that there is
>only a 1.e-17 chance they would get these results by chance. They may be
>mistaken, but if the results they describe are real, then you would
>certainly not expect to be able to get it from any text.

	I guess I used the wrong word by writing "massaged the text." I
didn't mean to imply that anything was done to the text per se, but
rather that any large text run against this type of program is bound to
come up with some correlations of this kind.  As an example, I cite Marc
Shapiro's comments in m.j v10#53 regarding codes in the works of William
Shakespeare that seem to indicate that they were, in fact, written by
Francis Bacon.  In the same way that the logic there is faulty and no
respected scholars really believe that Bacon wrote Shakespeare, the
logic here is faulty, too, even if the statistical analysis is flawless.

	He then ends with:

>By the way, I don't see why it is necessary to try it with many other
>texts, as Shaya suggests. It seems that one or two other texts (as
>Witztum, et al have done) is enough to eliminate the possibility that
>there is an error in their method of analysis. If it turned out to work
>with the Koran or the New Testament, that certainly wouldn't explain
>away the phenomenon, or show that it could be due to chance. In fact,
>someone told me he heard that people are already making claims that
>phenomena like this occur in the Koran. And those people undoubtedly
>have _lots_ more funds available to "mekarev" Jews than Aish Hatorah
>does. Which should confirm Shaya's feeling that it is not "healthy or
>stable for someone to base their belief ...in Judaism on the codes."

	I'd like to see what kinds of "facts" such codes in the Koran
or the New Testament "prove."  I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if
they came up with some rather unflattering "truths" about Jews and/or
Judaism, given who their researchers are likely to be.  If that turns
out to be the case, where does it leave those whose belief rests to any
significant degree on codes in the Torah?

	Another question I'd like to see addressed is the number of
correlations the researchers have tried with no success.  These things
don't just jump out of a neutral statistical analysis; they have to be
sought individually.  What else have they looked for and not found?

	As for trying this type of analysis on other texts, the more the
merrier and the longer the better; you obviously can't find much to
correlate in Ogden Nash's rhyme, "How odd/Of God/To choose/The Jews."

	Yours in Torah,
Rick Turkel         (___  ____  _  _  _  _  _     _  ___   _   _ _  ___
(<rmt51@...>)         )    |   |  \  )  |/ \     |    |   |   \_)    |
Rich or poor,          /     |  _| __)/   | __)    | ___|_  |  _( \    |
it's good to have money.            Ko rano rani,  |  u jamu pada.


End of Volume 10 Issue 96