Volume 37 Number 50
                 Produced: Wed Oct 23  6:38:15 US/Eastern 2002

Subjects Discussed In This Issue: 

Becoming a Minister
         [Wendy Baker]
Business Ethics
         [Hillel (Sabba) Markowitz]
         [Goldfinger, Andy]
Hamar Medina
         [Ira L. Jacobson]
Marat Eiyen
         [David Waxman]
Marit Eiyin
         [Ben Katz]
Modesty/Manus Friedman
         [Simcha Plisner]
         [Klafter, Andrew (KLAFTEAB)]
Reshut Ha'Rabbim
         [Gilad J. Gevaryahu]
Strict / Lenient
         [Carl Singer]


From: Wendy Baker <wbaker@...>
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2002 13:25:25 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Re: Becoming a Minister

> From: <Dagoobster@...> (Chaim Shapiro)
> Working in the field I do, I could save a substantial amount of money if
> I were able to declare parsonage.  I am not a Rabbi, and I don't think I
> would ever have the time to attain semicha.  I have heard from others
> that there are Christian Ministries which will declare a person a
> Reverend for a small fee, without any religious requirements.  Is it
> Halchaikally permissible to pay for, receive and use the title of
> Reverend from a Christian Ministry if I in no way believe in any of the
> tenets of their faith?

I don't know about the Halacha here, but imagine it would not be
permitted, but as far a Dina dmalcht dina, this would be unaccetable.
You would be violating local law, in trying to evade taxes by falsely
claiming to be a minister.  I would think that even paying for this
false divinity degree would be abetting a crime in some form, or , at
least supporting one.

We all would love to pay fewer taxes, but this is not the way to go
about it.

Wendy Baker


From: Hillel (Sabba) Markowitz <Sabba.Hillel@...>
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2002 16:10:51 -0400
Subject: Re: Business Ethics

> From: <CARLSINGER@...> (Carl Singer)
> Related thoughts
> I've seen situations where merchants offer not to charge tax if they are
> paid in cash.  Are YOU as the consumer thus violating the civil law by
> abetting the merchant (who, likely, wants cash to "hide" revenue from
> his books to thus avoid taxes.)  What are the halachik implications
> regarding dino malchuso dino -- laws of the land.

In certain circumstances, a merchant is not allowed (by the credit card
agreement) to give a "discount for cash" (charge a lower price).  As a
result, some merchants will offer to pay the state sales tax themselves
whaen an item is purchased for cash.  Thus, you are not abetting a tax
fraud, the merchant is stating that he will not charge you the extra fee
that would go to cover the sales tax.  Technically, you as the customer
never owe the sales tax, the merchant does.  I do not think that you as
the customer can assume that the merchant will use your cash purchase to
avoid the sales tax.

One example of this occurred with the gasoline tax.  Gas stations used
to post the base price and the tax with the total registered on the
pump.  The politicians realized that this was causing the consumer to
realize how much of the price went to taxes and to resent the
politicians.  As a result, they forbade this practice.

Hillel (Sabba) Markowitz
<sabbahem@...>, Sabba.Hillel@verizon.net


From: Goldfinger, Andy <Andy.Goldfinger@...>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2002 07:18:17 -0400
Subject: Correction

In a previous posting on the post Yom Kippur "Slach Lanu," I quoted a
Rav Vavad ZT"L from Sunderland.  I would like to thank Peretz Mett for
correcting me: the correct name of the Rav is "Babad."


From: Ira L. Jacobson <laser@...>
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2002 21:46:44 +0200
Subject: Re: Hamar Medina

David Ziants <dziants@...> wrote:

>Firstly, in the body of the article he discusses at length the well
>known halacha that alcoholic drinks can be a wine substitute

Not for the "serious" qiddush on leil shabbat.  One who does not have
wine may make qiddush then on bread, as brought by the Mehaber quoting
the Rosh in OH 272:9.  The Rema goes even further and rules that if wine
is available anywhere in that city (as amplified by the Mishna Berura
272:24), and the one making qiddush does not drink wine because he has
made such a vow, he should nevertheless recite the blessing on wine, and
someone *else* should drink it.

And even with regard to havdala, the Mishna Berura states (296:9) that
one should use wine rather than any other beverage, and use a substitute
*only* if he has no wine.

The Mishna Berura goes on to quote from Sha`arei Teshuva, who quotes
Birkei Yosef that one may not make havdala on milk or oil.  And he
restates that in Mishna Berura 272:25.

I checked the Birkei Yosef 296:2, who does indeed state that many people
misunderstand the Mehaber's statement that liquids other than water
would permit them to make havdala on milk or oil.  But the Birkei Yosef
calls this an error!

>In the conclusion to the article, where he summarises the less obvious
>issues, his opinion is that:
>(1) Milk - Seems from the Birkat Yosef

I thought that this was perhaps a typo for Birkei Yosef, but reading
further showed that it could not be, since the conclusion is the
opposite of the Birkei Yosef's.  So who is this poseq known as the
Birkat Yosef?

>(Orach Chayim 296:3) that this is
>chamar medina especially as in the Gemara Kritut (13) milk used to be
>alcoholic, and those who disallowed it was because it wasn't a common
>drink in their locale. The matter still needs research for today, as
>milk is not served at parties etc.

This seems to be the opposite of what the Mishna Berura thought that the
Birkei Yosef said.  I have not checked the primary source and would be
grateful to anyone who does so and reports to us.

>Shoko [= chocolate drink] made from a mixture of milk cocoa powder and
>sugar, however, is an "important" non-thirst-quencher drink, and is
>chamar medina. Although it is not drunk so frequently this isn't an
>issue in societies where "important" drinks are drunk less often (Aruch
>HaShulchan 272:14) .

Please clarify.  You might describe the Aruch HaShulchan's general
thesis here, and how it differs from that of the Mishna Berura.

The Mishna Berura 296:10 (based on the Turei Zahav) disqualifies drinks
or soups made from beets or sorrel even in an emergency, since, although
they are drunk by the masses, are not regarded as important.

>(2) Natural juices are called hamar medina.

*All* natural juices?  For example, the juice of a vegetable that no one
present has ever tasted and grows only in a faraway land?

In summary, there are some interesting theses presented here, but they
need clarification.



From: David Waxman <yitz99@...>
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2002 18:02:06 +0200
Subject: Marat Eiyen

>[Actually, I think the "onus" is on the one delivering a halachic p'sak
>to be able to distinguish what falls under the halachic rubric of "marat
>eiyen" and what does not. If one of the members of the list would like
>to try and give some guidance on what might fall under marat eiyen and
>what does not, that would probably be valuable. Mod.]

Iggeret Moshe OC/a ch. 96, p. 147 states (my translation):
"The prohibition  of marat eiyen applies only to an action that, while one 
does it in a permissible manner, is done in a forbidden manner in the 
majority of cases..."

Examples cited:
1. Allowing a non Jewish worker, hired on a contract basis, to work on your 
job on Shabbat, if that type of work is normally done by day workers.
2. Hanging laundry to dry on Shabbat.

The writer of the letter had seen Rav Moshe ride in a car on Friday
afternoon after candle lighting time and asked Rav Moshe if this was not
a case of marat eiyen as many people think that malacha is forbidden at
this time.  Rav Moshe provided the above definition and explained that
this was not marat eiyen as malacha is indeed permissible for men up
until a couple of minutes before sun set and that he had left in ample
time prior to this.  In this case, if an observer thought that Rav Moshe
was doing something wrong, it would be due to his lack of halachic
knowledge, and thus marat eiyen is not applicable.

The humble Rav Moshe praised the writer for his admonishment and agreed to 
cease riding in cars after candle lighting as the writer felt that it might 
lead some misinformed observers to a kilkul Shabbat.


From: Ben Katz <bkatz@...>
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2002 15:18:03 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Re: Marit Eiyin

>From: Perry Zamek <jerusalem@...>
>Perhaps the issue of Marit Eiyin is more like the following: I may not
>do X, so that the average (read, non-learned) Jew should not conclude
>that Y (which is similar to X) is permitted. In the present example,
>perhaps I may not remove laundry from an outdoor clothesline, because a
>Jew who might be passing may assume that doing laundry on Shabbat is
>permitted (and he is not aware that the laundry was washed and hung
>prior to Shabbat).

     I believe Perry is basically correct.  I was taught tate for marit
eyen to be applicable, one has to see the ENTIRE ACTION and think
someone sinned.  Just seeing clothes in a dryer thus would not qualify,
and the "dan lekaf zechut" should beoperative.

Ben Z. Katz, M.D.
Children's Memorial Hospital, Division of Infectious Diseases
2300 Children's Plaza, Box # 20, Chicago, IL 60614
Ph. 773-880-4187, Fax 773-880-8226, Voicemail and Pager: 3034
e-mail: <bkatz@...>


From: Simcha Plisner <splisner@...>
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2002 13:43:34 -0500
Subject: Modesty/Manus Friedman

Russell Hendel quoting R. Manus Friedman (Lubavitch Chasid) says that
the reason for restrictions is that it establishes boundaries.

This is absolutely correct and the main reason for opposition. It is an
attempt to set boundaries by people who fear modernity and secular
society and wish to separate them selves from it. They wish to send
messages that we do not value society as it has evolved. It sends this
message to Jews and non-Jews alike. Oh yes, they wish the benefits of
modern technology, and even to benefit from the wealth of people who
subscribe to modernity, but not the underlying western secular values
that made the discovery of those technologies possible and the creation
of that wealth possible. It is in many ways spitting into the well from
which they themselves drink.

It puts walls between those of us who understand - Halacha k/ Beit
Hillel - for liniency. Who understand B'al tosif to demand a rejection
of most attempts at g'zeirot and most chumrot. It turns off the majority
of am yisrael and puts a wall up which limits any ability of kiruv and
any effort to maintain am echad.

Some people insist on living in the past and isolating themselves from
everyone else. They have that right but it does not mean that it is
halachikly justified. Whenever I hear people who seek to dress in
manners similar to 18th and 19th century, I ask, why not like the Jews
who lived in the time of the Mishna?

Simcha Plisner


From: Klafter, Andrew (KLAFTEAB) <KLAFTEAB@...>
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2002 11:13:53 -0400
Subject: Quinois

Has anyone adjudicated what blessing should be made for the new grain,
Quinois? It's obviously not borei minei mezonos.  I'm not sure if it should
be ha'adoma or she-hakol.  I'm interested in anyone's reasoning, but more
interested in a reference to a p'sak.
-nachum klafter


From: <Gevaryahu@...> (Gilad J. Gevaryahu)
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2002 11:54:50 EDT
Subject: Re: Reshut Ha'Rabbim

David Waxman (MJv37n43) gave the definition of Reshut Ha'Rabbim.
He enumerated:
1. <<metropolitan areas that have boulevards wider than 16 cubits (about
10 yards or 9 meters).>>
2. <<'yeish omrim' to say that any area that does not have 600,000
travelers pass by daily is not a 'reishut harabim'.>>

This presentation is unfair since the boulevard wider that 16 amot is
valid only on a "mefuleshet" condition, that is a staight line boulevard
from begining to the end of the city. Which mean that even if the
boulevard is wider that 16, but it turns around it does not make that
place reshut ha'rabim.

Also, there is an issue of who counts amongst the 600,000. If they are
all in cars, buses etc, which is "reshut ha'yachid" - they do not count
for the 600,000 according to some shitot.

Gilad J. Gevaryahu


From: <CARLSINGER@...> (Carl Singer)
Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2002 09:11:52 EDT
Subject: Strict / Lenient

      Eliyahu's comments might lead one to believe that the lenient
      opinion which allows communities to erect eruvim in metropolitan
      areas is normative, while the strict opinion tends towards the

I was much impressed by something that Michael Rogovin noted in a recent
Mail Jewish --

      Today, at least in the US, the presumption is that if you are to
      the right of me, you are presumed valid; if to the left, presumed
      not so.  Thus, many legitimate differences in halachic thought,
      practice or psak found in so-called modern or centrist orthodoxy
      are deemed illegitimate by the "yeshiva" or hareidi community.

"Strict and lenient" not only imply a spectrum with interpretation and
observance which is I believe good, but also imply a spectrum some
"value" which is wrong.

There is nothing to imply that, to use the first example, using the eruv
is of some greater religious value (piety, observance, yereh Shamayim)
than NOT using the eruv.  Conversely there is nothing to imply that NOT
using the eruv is of greater religious value ....  There's no rating
scheme along this axis.

Take another, more linear example.  Plony A holds 6 hours (Fleishig to
Milchig), Plony B holds into the 6th hour (5+) Plony C holds 3 hours.
So what!!!  Are you going to claim that Plony A is in any way frummer,
more pious, more / better observant, has greater yereh Shamayim?  Why
not hold 7 hours then and out do the Jones?  (One could argue that using
a solar hour which extends to 72 minutes in the summer ....)

Serious Rabbis have ruled differently on several topics.  Some black &
white (Mutter, Usser) others involving gradations.  

Kol Tov

Carl Singer


End of Volume 37 Issue 50